What actually makes or breaks a biotech startup - and why is it rarely the science?
In this episode of Boba & Biotech, Adam Jenkins and I enjoy some delicious grapefruit-coconut sago from Heytea while we discuss the hidden dynamics shaping today’s biotech ecosystem. From the inside workings of incubators like BioLabs and LabCentral to the uncomfortable truth about “zombie” startups, this conversation pulls back the curtain on what really happens between breakthrough science and company success.
Along the way, Adam shares hard-earned insights from years of evaluating and advising early-stage companies, revealing why culture trumps data, why your first hires matter more than your pitch deck, and why taking VC money too early might be your biggest mistake.
If you’re a founder, operator, or investor navigating biotech, this episode is equal parts reality check and roadmap.
Adam Jenkins is the regional site director for BioLabs, where he manages sites across Boston, Cambridge, Vermont, and Toronto. BioLabs is a global innovation infrastructure company creating the physical and community backbone that powers life science discovery worldwide. Prior to BioLabs Adam worked at Biogen, a global biotech focused on neurology, where he headed their data science teams and helped lead their portfolio strategy. He holds a PhD in genetics from Boston College and an MBA from Indiana University.
Links
Armon’s LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/in/armonsharei/
Adam’s LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/in/adammjenks/
Biolabs: https://www.biolabs.io/
Credits
Hosted by Armon Sharei, PhD
Research by Julie Kim, MBA
Produced by Arielle Nisseblatt of Pinwheel, Andressa Carroll, Portal
Edited and mixed by David Woje of Pinwheel
[00:00:00]
Kalvs: you know what you need to be good at to finish your PhD are not the same things that you need to be good at if you wanna run a company.
people who are adaptable, flexible, you change the
way they think about move into some CEO role and so on, right? Yeah. And in some cases it's
actually much better for
everybody involved that
company founder the CSO, right?
And, not the business
Armon: How often do
you think the student themselves gets that, like, that they're self-aware enough that, oh, I shouldn't.
Kalvs: You
Armon: I should be CEOI should
be CS o or vice versa.
Kalvs: There are
people who have
had many more students going to startups be better
able to answer that
Armon: Well,
Klaus, thanks a lot for joining [00:01:00] and sounds like it's your first time having Boba.
What's the verdict so far?
Kalvs: It's fine. It's fine. Well, thank you Bob.
Armon: What are, what are our critiques because you got the green tea with like mango and bubbles in it.
Kalvs: Thank you for inviting me. Yeah, it's fine. Um, it's all sweet.
Armon: We'll on that next time, uh, people need their sugar rush. So, Devin, thanks for joining.
If you wouldn't mind giving a little bit of, uh, background on yourself, I mean, you were, you've been a professor at MIT for a long time, but just a little bit of background on how you got there, so we have context as we the
Kalvs: I started my
career as
a academician at University of Minnesota, which was a wonderful I was actually quite happy there. I recently had got my PhD in Catalysis and Reaction Engineering, [00:02:00] and thanks to one of my colleague actually.
We said, have you ever looked at Chemical vapor deposition? And I started looking at it and started working with people at at t Bell Laboratories and IBM and really got interested in how understand the processes that we're using and, um,
you know. We sort of gone full circle. We are back to of of interest again.
Speaker 2: Mm-hmm.
Kalvs: But anyway,
so, um, and, um, MIT thought that really could use people that had that kind of knowledge of work with
understanding industrial processes and coming up new approaches important problems modern technology.
And so I got hired and, uh, [00:03:00] and uh,
so for a number of years, uh, worked in molecular electronics, processing all the around that. Materials in general was interested in chips. And since we knew so much about silicon manufacturing, I got together with Marty Schmidt, who was a Mims manufacturer. And so I was thinking about, well, what could you actually use Mims technology to, besides things like accelerometers Yeah.
And so on. Um, and, uh, did it make any sense chemical biological applications? And this was also at the time when there was a lot of analysis emerge.
And so we got into the field of micro total analysis and really with the idea of what could you actually do?
Beyond analysis
Speaker 2: [00:04:00] Yeah.
Kalvs: And that sort of
led to then making chemicals on a chip. And then you ask why would you make small amounts of And where would you make small And, then, uh, in the biology space, we started by thinking about, well, what could you do with cells on that made sense separating out mitochondria. and ultimately that led to the project of, inject high rate. That obviously was a barrier for many, many things across the cell membranes. And then sort of where you came into the picture, right?
Yeah. And so, um, and a time when we hit.
Figured out how to
do it with a single needle and getting the cells stuck on the needle and, come
up with a very complicated system to try and shoot stuff
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: but also this
work that we had was making things on chips and [00:05:00] making things in small amounts were obviously pharmaceutical they're larger Yep. But also was
sort of a continuation and a very small scale of classical chemical engineering doing things in And so when you ask yourself if, well that's okay, but instead of doing things at the billion tons, a million tons, what if you only had to do a ton or less a year?
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: Could you think about how to do that? And then it sort of led to our interest in flow chemistry of modernizing pharmaceutical
Armon: you know, you were head of the chemical engineering department at some point, so I guess I'm, one thing just
for level
setting with the audience, I'm curious about is like, what made you wanna stay on the academic side versus, going into industry at some point?
Kalvs: Well
Armon: and dealing with, you know, unruly students like me throughout your
career.
Kalvs: Well, actually dealing with the students was probably the thing that kept me in there because that was [00:06:00] but
when
I first started out, um, I used to tell my wife, you know, if I don't get tenure, it's not such a,
a problem I can quit
and double my salary and half my And
so,
um. But I think what really kept me, uh, in working
was really
the interaction with the students and the ability to pick up new problems, learn new things,
continually learn all the time. Of course, you can do that in industry too.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: I sort of felt like Very happy to do this with learning alongside my students who will work my best
Armon: I guess with that motivation of both
the students and the new technologies, what's your view of kind of the evolution of these technologies where, like
what are the phases where it's ideal? They say academic, what are the
phases at which. They should go into some kind of startup,
uh, [00:07:00] versus they should just go straight
to a big company.
Uh,
and what technologies
should die, uh,
because they're, they're,
cute, but otherwise useless.
Uh, and I know it's a broad question, but just kind of, you come at it from a very different perspective
than
some others word. '
cause you're often observing the origination of them, uh, when others won't see it till much later.
Kalvs: I think there's sort of a, a lot of people I think, generally agrees of these things, right? So there are certain projects, maybe purely of academic interest. It's
sort of
like, how does this work? Sort of, mm-hmm. but there's not, they don't solve a need. Mm-hmm. So it's gonna be very hard
to justify
how are you.
gonna in making a product out of this that you can sell. Project that is still very early on where if you started a the company would essentially become a research organization try and figure out how to actually And that's probably too early, So somewhere [00:08:00] in between those two extremes is sort of where. The best you've gotta think about two, for instance, something general that people can apply, like for example, in pharmaceutical processing.
There's certainly
opportunities for people building. Um,
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Kalvs: But it's hard to build, you major company doing that and,
it
was a service company.
Right. But there were, a fragment that they're big pharma companies. Right. But then they're also all the, small. CMOs, that the contract manufacturing right? They really don't have the ability to use these things.
Speaker 2: Yep.
Kalvs: um,
and then there's the other thing with something like this is that since it's a technology that replaces an existing [00:09:00] uh, you have to get around the accountants, right?
You. You go to the boss and say, we like to put in this new technology. that says, yeah, well we have all this other stuff that we have capital invested in.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And It's gonna cost us a fortune to rip one out and put the other one in, and how are we ever gonna And so in that case, it becomes very difficult.
And that's why, for instance, this technology that we're supposed to be a real aid to European and American chemical Is doing fabulously in China.
Armon: Yeah,
Kalvs: because they're all starting Manu. factories. There's nothing in them. So I can start with the more on technology first, rather than having to think about if I put that new technology and What do I do with all my old patch
Armon: is an interesting way
to think about that, that. If the new technology is highly
differentiated, then even
people with
a lot of vested interest in the old school stuff will
probably find a way to
make it work. But if it's
a more meaningful but still
[00:10:00] incremental improvement,
it's only
gonna go into the next factory.
It's never gonna Right. Replace the That's right. And
does that mean that
normally you've observed
the more Still meaningful, but incremental improvements become very
hard. To spin out or get going in a quick manner,
but the massive
differentiators are the ones that have a
And
I guess as.
You think about,
you know, the, I'm sure you've seen many flavors of this in your lab or other labs where
people come up with cool
new things and
some of them
spin out, some of them don't. Some of them just die on a shelf. I
mean, they may have had a great paper at
some point, but B, nothing happened past that paper.
What do you think is a, let's say at the lab level, the difference
between the labs
that do
spin out a lot of things versus the ones that don't Like what,
what, in your
view, tended to define those
Kalvs: Well, I think there tend to be labs that are very entrepreneurial.
Armon: And
is that a culture
difference or a structure
Kalvs: I [00:11:00] think it's a
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And I think it's sort of self reinforces.
So students that come in and really want to their own which tend to gravitate towards
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And then there are laboratories that are really set A very strong foundation in the sciences, and the idea go out and group, maybe you'll go
Armon: and when you, whether it's in your lab or other people's labs,
let's say when
you see two technologies that
you think, both
of them have a great shot at making a difference, but one of them ends up being a successful spin out, the other one ends up not Successful. What's, what do you feel like is the most common difference
far as what happened?
Kalvs: I haven't spent enough time looking at that.
If
I could tell you that, I could probably be very
good.
Armon: What do you think it's often a technical thing or a
people thing
or,
Kalvs: a multitude of things, [00:12:00] people timing, is often You happen something out that shows up to be a really revolutionary thing that everybody is interested in.
Armon: Oh. Like the, the broader macro cycle of
people's interests in this space. Enables that.
Kalvs: And so there's more money available to you to invest, great thing, but. The market is going down and then nobody wants to invest,
Armon: Do
you think that's
a more dominant phenomenon than let's the people
involved with it?
Kalvs: No. I
think
Armon: it's okay if, yes, I might. You
Kalvs: have, to,
you
have to have both. I think you have to have have to have who has the vision and the ideas to
Armon: And
when
Kalvs: actually,
you have to have team that seldom
Armon: [00:13:00] that's true. And, and when you think about, let's say
the PhD students or postdocs that are chaperoning technologies through, are there characteristics of them that you've observed, like, okay, these are the ones that are more likely to These are the ones that.
Probably
shouldn't have done a startup.
Kalvs: No,
no. I've,
never, I don't think I've ever been able to, I, I think if you were able to predict that there to talk to you or,
Armon: or I guess maybe then flipping it, what do you think is the hardest things to tell?
Like, uh, you
know, in hindsight it becomes clear, but it's so hard to tell in advance.
Like, what are the
things they need to be good at that it's really hard to tell at the time.
Kalvs: Well,
as you know from your own experience, you know what you need to be good at to finish your PhD are not the same things that you need to be good at if you wanna run a company.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And so I, people who are adaptable, [00:14:00] flexible, you change the
way they think about move into some COE. CEO role and so on, right? Yeah. And in some cases it's
actually much better for
everybody involved that
company founder the CSO, right?
And, not the business
Armon: How often do
you think the student themselves gets that, like, that they're self-aware enough that, oh, I shouldn't.
Kalvs: You
Armon: I should be CEOI should
be CS o or vice versa.
Kalvs: There are
people who have
had many more students going to startups be better
able to answer that
Armon: what do you
think are the best ways tell if a technology is ready for going out there?
Versus
it should [00:15:00] wait and incubate more
on
the academic side.
Kalvs: I think getting feedback investors, does this really address the
need?
something that can grow?
total get an evaluation Yeah,
and I think in many ways that's where
MIT have an advantage large
number of alumni that have gone out and started reengage
and
talk with students and provide, right?
Mm-hmm. responder center at MIT, Um, you know, we had a, I think, a very nice sort of series of grants where they had catalysts communities people on the help them go to the next the wonderful paper to [00:16:00] idea that
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And getting the feedback of what would you need to which is not something. is taught in the engineering school. that's another nice thing there are
all
these courses that are taught Right?
Yeah. Taught people who have started, many cases, many companies
Armon: yeah.
Kalvs: That provide, I think, very
Armon: Actually, that's
an interesting
note there where. I feel like a lot of
the university's dream of the business school and the, you know, technical departments having some kind of synergy that leads to more spin outs where you're coupling up an
MBA
with a PhD
Amazing, glorious
things can
happen, but I feel like it doesn't actually
happen that often. Uh, do you have
a guess
as to why that is?
Because at least I would say that was my observation. [00:17:00] I
feel like
both
Sloan and the engineering departments really aspired have a lot of
these couplings occur, and
they would keep trying to
catalyze it,
but I don't think that many would happen.
Kalvs: I did. Some happen. I saw some happen. Okay. people, you know, engineers that hooked up with friends from the business school and they were on teams of three, or three,
Armon: yeah. Okay.
Kalvs: W start
Armon: Yeah, because I, I sometimes felt like. There
seemed to be a little too much of a
personality
mismatch as
the engineering
PhDs weren't, uh, the same personality type as the sloes. It was
hard for them to get along
Kalvs: I think that was very personal people
got along. Right. Yeah. And then actually some of the engineering people did really well by essentially Business people.
Right. So, um,
Armon: yeah.
Kalvs: know, there are people who have come out of chemical engineering [00:18:00] and be directors
Armon: what what do you think are the. Skillset that they developed during
their PhD that still help them there versus you were also partially mentioning what it takes to be successful on the
startup side
isn't really exactly what PhD selects but what do you think are the common threads?
Kalvs: MITI
think what we really try to teach do is how to, how to think and how to solve problems. I think the skillset
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: sort of the problem solving And then, so instead of applying it to, a chemical problem, it'd be a financial problem, right?
Mm-hmm. And a lot of, um,
better,
especially in modern finance, a lot of that, you know, the types of equations that you had to solve are not all that different. an [00:19:00] insight into what's actually going on here and what can I tweak to
Armon: No, because I think
from my, from my experience
in a way the
PhD was good about like, you have open-ended problems and you just gotta figure it out, right?
And in a
way that's
very similar to startup, where it's
a very open-ended Uh, as opposed to being in a very structured
corporate environment where
if you get plucked out of it
and do something, where's my
instruction set? Who do I call
to ask about
Kalvs: Right
Armon: this problem or that problem?
They just gotta figure it out on their own. Um, when you, when you've seen cases of like academic background, founders try to spin something out and it crashes and burns, uh, what do you think were the most common reasons that that would happen?
Kalvs: I don't think I'm actually.
Seen that close up. Yeah.
so that's very hard to [00:20:00] We have ideas come up and then, know, lead to big spinoffs like Moten Metals, like, which for a while was then some cases there are lots of things that.
the leadership or funding at that period, that was just critical
new need for
Armon: you've probably seen
cases over
the years where something spins out, whether it was from an it or and you're like, that's a
Uh,
but it spun out
anyway.
What do you think happens in those
cases?
Uh, let, let's assume you were right about it being
a stupid idea, but like,
what do you think happens
in those cases? That's something that, let's say
people like yourself who are in that
zone and know that
this,
there's no way that's
true
or there's no way
this is gonna work,
but it happens
anyway.[00:21:00]
Why, why do you think that happens? Or how do, how do those
Kalvs: Well,
in some cases it's, it's. It sort of happens because there's so much excitement about this field. Right?
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: I
was, my point was a part of APA program, portable power There was
so much excitement about this and people provided all kinds of suggestions powerful Um,
and I
remember at the first program meeting there was, I would say there Iron. Many others had concern not only about whether the second law was being violated, but whether the first law was being violated.
Okay. And so, and as the program went on when these people went away from violating thermodynamic laws, right?
Yeah. It's something that
one could have maybe had looked at from the beginning. Right.
And there was some startup companies that clearly we're violating Fundamental right?
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah.
Kalvs: And in
some cases, they got
under control and [00:22:00] someone actually stepped in and said, this isn't gonna work, but let's think about what could work.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And then got out.
of It
came manageable
Armon: just like one more layer on those topics. So I'd imagine one end of of it is whoever's championing
this is a great storyteller, and that's part of why they can cause this excitement and make it happen.
What do you think, let's say their enablers, IE in this case, their investors, or if they have a corporate partner, uh, or grants miss because
they must have.
People like yourself in their ear saying like there's no way.
Uh, and yet they still
do it anyway.
Kalvs: Well, well maybe they didn't get all
the necessary advice, right?
Armon: Oh,
Um,
because it is
ing when
audio fix: those
Kalvs: things, happen, not because it's not perfect, right? You, I mean, you,
you think
you talked to all the right people in terms of the investment
Armon: Right.
Kalvs: And maybe there are questions
and you believe the.
Founders that that's because they're not, [00:23:00] many of these questions are never clear cut. Right? Right. right. and so you give the founders the benefit of the doubt.
find out later on that, oh no, let's, let's change that. Let's go back to something else. Yes.
Armon: Yeah. Okay.
we talked a bit about the startups, but you've had a lot of experience
from the academic side working with the pharmas or the other
big companies.
What are things that
you the bigger orgs are actually pretty
good at and often don't necessarily get credit
for it
because it's easy to hate on the big
Kalvs: you know, a lot of
big companies are very good at, doing what they're spo, what they're supposed who were very innovative and good at 3M
used to have a sort of a mantra of 10% innovations every year, right? [00:24:00] They've continued to be been Right?
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Kalvs: Corning has also an example moved into new areas, new pharma, I think there's a good job of trying to really come
up with new pharmaceuticals that will help people.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And making sure that they're safe
and manufacturing
them.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: and they continue to innovate and how they've built these, you know, the discovery platforms as well as how to actually better. And yeah. if you just even look today at pharma.
How fast
they have moved into AI and gotten it working really using it and making advances. Right. Yeah. There are a lot of other places where people argue whether AI is really contributing. I don't think there's anyone in pharma that will de debate the development [00:25:00] time.
Armon: and I guess related to that, especially for
these more
innovative
big companies.
What
do you think it is that they're usually missing or they're strategically choosing
to miss when they don't and license new tech? That looks interesting and instead that New Tech has to become a startup, um,
if it's ever gonna
flourish. '
these
guys should get it. But
either they,
I don't know, they don't get it or
they don't see it.
What, what do you think is the miss there?
Kalvs: Very often a startup is willing to take risks that public a pharma might not be willing to make.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: It's just,
you know, a, a disease target that's outside the sort of standard you see Target they're looking at. Right. Or it Biology
that is unproven. you know, they would have to take the technique and prove that this the technology works and [00:26:00] then apply
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And they know, and I think that's true. That that's, that's not what they're best at.
Because that doesn't quite fit into sort of what they, how they plant, they normally want their business. Right.
Armon: Right.
Kalvs: It's much better to let it. So
it's much better for them to fund a small company to try it out. Right,
Armon: right.
Kalvs: And if it works well,
Armon: Yeah.
They'd rather have the lower risk, lower reward
profile
Kalvs: right
Armon: down the I feel like so much revolves around authorship
of papers, who's
first, who's last, et cetera. So it does have some
individualistic incentives there because so much is tied to where you are on a paper.
Uh, whereas
ultimately the kinds of things that'll.
Make big movements in the, let's call it
real world, are more
team oriented things. And I think often a contrast that PhD types immediately feel from going into, let's say a startup environment
versus academic
is like, oh, it's so much more team oriented, [00:27:00] um, than it was an academic case. Are there things there that, I dunno, you one could better
to encourage
that teamwork
early on?
Or maybe you
disagree with that premise
altogether,
Kalvs: I, I
really encourage
people in my group to work together and then very, very often we had what I would call really teams, The latest work that we had on
self-driving laboratories.
was was the teamwork. There were a whole group of people and it certainly, and the people that the work part of the work that was done in my lab was really driven I think teamwork still is something that we try
to encourage.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And
I think this business of who's wearing the paper has been blown out of proportion by, in many cases to students themselves.
Armon: Correct.
Kalvs: it's true that it's important that you have something when you graduate that you can sort of point to is well, you this is [00:28:00] what I did.
Right. point of the research or independent but on the other hand, it's, it's not. Counting game that I think the students imagine. I think a hiring committee sitting and counting. the,
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah.
Kalvs: Some places maybe do that, but I don't think that papers are really looking for talent.
Yeah. Question of, you know, what,
what have
you really managed to yeah. and
so? It doesn't matter where you're, what does matter is that you can show that something that where you played a key role. And then there are well, that also counts, right? Where you were assisting.
Right. But that's also important. Yeah. team player, otherwise, if you're gonna have a department run, you can't, everybody can't be PRI on then
Armon: related to some of those
comments, kind of zooming
it out and comparing different
universities and institutions,
you know,
what do you think are the most,
um.
[00:29:00] Important things that some universities do, like let's say MIT, pretty good about having
startup
spin outs versus University X that isn't good at it. Uh,
what do you think are the
pieces that are in place at somewhere like MIT that's,
other places don't have either 'cause they chose not to have it
or didn't think to have it.
Kalvs: Well, it sort of goes back to what we talked about earlier. I think part of it is
just sort of in the
genetic makeup of the place.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: So, T has
done this for a long time, and early on in the early days when it sort of started facilitated this by making rules and regulations. I mean, I think a lot of people on the outside think that MIT you could do anything you wanted to.
Right. Well, we actually had
very clear rules about what
you could do and what you couldn't do. Yeah. And how student involvement should be handled and so on. All these conflicts of interest rules. Yeah. Which made it much clearer for people how to do it. And then of course, then you have people that come and because there were people that were successful [00:30:00] and started right.
They were, they're willing to, and they came back and helped other people start It created a whole
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And if you don't have an infrastructure of advisors and experience a student that wants to do this and join up because they want to do it, yeah. You don't have the same ecosystem and so universities have had that, but it's very hard to start that farm and mouth.
Armon: How much do you think, let's say location matters as far as proximity to the investors and proximity pharmas
or other biotechs in the context
this?
Because you know, MIT, Harvard, they're in Boston, so conveniently it's a hub, whereas if you just picked up MIT and put it.
Somewhere very far away
from the coasts,
uh, would it have had a much
lower spin out rate?
Kalvs: I think that's
an impossible
question.
Armon: Yeah, yeah. Fair
Kalvs: to answer because it's, it's sort of,
it's also intertwined, [00:31:00] right?
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Kalvs: because some companies moved here because students were educated and I think you see the same thing in maybe at different scales, in different right.
Centers around, there are areas around academic institutions small startup companies or larger they know there's a supply of talented
Armon: we've often
come across people that might be
I dunno, different regions, let's say Europe or us.
They have
cool tech, but they all feel like unless
they move to Boston
Uh, they're just never gonna get enough, uh, you know, money or talent to be able to do what they're gonna do.
But, but I agree. I could see it
being a very intertwined,
self-reinforcing. Network where, because
a certain critical mass of an ecosystem is there, it just begets more of the same in a, in a good way, right?
But also makes it [00:32:00] super hard to
how many like biotech
startup centers does
need? Uh, because
from a scale
perspective, why would you need like
10 of
kind of in the home stretch, if you had a. Your magic wand you could wave. What is one
thing you would change
about how
academic, uh, academia interacts with startups
make these transitions
more likely
to succeed?
More of the right
things going out. Whatever your metric is, you could just change one thing.
Kalvs: I,
don't think I have a magic, I don't have a a, a particular thing that I think more successful or less successful. Yeah. I, feel that, I'm sure there are things we could change to make it less but I'm not sure what we should do to guarantee success.
Armon: Well, I know, I guarantee, but make it
more probable
or, or something
you think that we do well that we [00:33:00] have to make sure we 'cause so much depends on that factor
Kalvs: Well, so you know, the first thing is you have to bring in the talent.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: The second thing is you have to educate them well, think about new ideas fundamental in how And then understand the basics so And then as I, I mentioned several times before is I think that. Encourage them to participate in the ecosystem, talk to other people who have done this. mean, you, you wouldn't go in and operate a piece of expensive piece of equipment, uh, trying to learn from another one how actually works, right?
Yeah. Yeah. Same way. If you're going to do, you know, start a company, talk to people who have done it before.
Armon: any trends
you're seeing right now that like,
make you optimistic or pessimistic about the
future directions of science
Kalvs: Well, right [00:34:00] now I think we are in a really very difficult investments in science
lack
of
faith I see detrimental to everybody
Armon: Are there
things we all could be doing to gain more popular,
interest, respect,
acknowledgement for
the value of
science?
Kalvs: and it's been said many times and it's really difficult to do,
but
really communicate with the general populace what we do, how we do it, and why it's
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: But not lecture to the, but engage the population and the outcome.
Armon: Part of the point of
this interview series. Right.
Making it more accessible. Are, are there any common
misconceptions you think that [00:35:00]
occur for the general populace
or students coming in, uh, about how academia works or what the
role of
professors and, and
graduate student programs are?
'cause there's also a big disconnect between how many people do undergrad versus actually go to
Kalvs: Well, there's always
been this, um, misconception of the ivory tower, right? Yeah. And there people that think, uh, big thoughts and don't do anything, and don't contribute anything. then I think, and then you combine that with a lot of static about whether
recently,
right about.
You know, is science doing the right thing? Or they're actually, is it true what they're saying? And because those, many of these problems are
complex.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Kalvs: And there
are no simple answers. And yet that many cases, public media and so on, lot of Yeah. so and so [00:36:00] trying to
tell
people what people actually do that they're not.
Actually many of them scurry around. Yeah. Make Academicians don't sit on top of some
time.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: And
how they scurry around and
do a lot
of stuff and really try to post, educate their students and also general public in terms of their
Armon: Well
actually that. I think an
interesting piece that I experienced, which was probably like the inverse
of that, which was
being in the ivory tower side.
Rightly or wrongly,
and maybe this was just me, but I don't think it was just me. You developed this impression that.
We're doing the hard part of
coming up with new stuff
and then some lower life
form can go translate it, uh, and turn
it into a product. Go sell it. 'cause like I think the idea
of sales is gag inducing to a PhD,
uh, or the, OR business stuff
is for more low lease, you know, MBAs to go do.[00:37:00]
We do only the kind of most elegant work of coming up with
new things, but. Speaking for myself, like part of the reason I jumped
was I'm like,
oh,
there's so much between, we came up with something and it's actually making a difference for people and
we have to jump out of this tower to do it. Uh, and it's not until you're
outside that you're like, oh wait, I was thinking about it all wrong.
Kalvs: I think that's only certain people that have, Yeah. I mean, you think about. People who have actually recently won major awards, right? Mm-hmm. They've also been very there, but started so major scientific awards. Yeah.
So
I think
they're
certainly fully aware
Speaker 2: right.
Kalvs: and I can emissions that, think that way must be crazy because, um. If they don't think they're selling when they write their grant proposals, I don't know what they do. Right.
Armon: Yeah.
Kalvs: They're, they're selling to a very narrow
audience of their peers,
right? Yeah. they're still [00:38:00] selling.
Armon: Yeah, no, I mean, I, I agree.
Kalvs: They're certainly convincing them that they're, their ideas that the right
ideas. maybe it's that selling, still sort
Armon: right.
Kalvs: Yeah.
Armon: Yeah. No, I agree. Because,
I, because I think that was one. that like, for me at least, and
maybe it's just a phase
that let's say the students and postdocs and maybe some early faculty go through, reality hits them in the face more later on as far as chasing all these grants and selling.
Um,
but I think
that was one uh, phenomenon that seems
Armon: Any final reflections or comments, things that you're passionate about these days?
Kalvs: the last thing we talked about, I think. it's really preserving.
the,
the wonderful, very exciting intellectual environment we Yeah. And making
sure that that persists.
Armon: [00:39:00] Agree. Well thank you very much.
Kalvs: Thank you.
Armon: We'll do less sugar next time.